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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Vernon 0. Teofan* and Jeanne E. O'Neill**
HIS Article addresses notable developments under Texas law in the
areas of creditor and consumer rights during the period November
1988 through October 1989. During the Survey period the Texas
Legislature enacted provisions limiting oral agreements pertaining to loans
in excess of $50,000,1 established a statutory definition of "rural home-
stead",2 and invalidated the filing of UCC-1 financing statements under a
debtor's trade name or assumed name.3 In addition, the Texas courts ren-
dered significant decisions dealing with usury, exemptions, and foreclosure.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Oral Agreements Limited
The Texas Legislature amended the Texas Business and Commerce Code
effective September 1, 1989, to add a new section 26.02 restricting the use of
oral agreements pertaining to loans by financial institutions.4 The amend-
ment renders a loan agreement exceeding $50,000 in value unenforceable
unless it is in writing and is signed by each obligor. In addition, the amend-
ment provides that such a loan agreement may not be modified orally prior
to or contemporaneously with the execution of the written contract.
A financial institution claiming the benefits of the amendment must incor-
porate into the loan documents a conspicuous notice disclaiming the exist-
ence and validity of contradictory oral understandings between the parties.5
In light of the apparent discrepancy between the language of the statute and
the broader suggested notice language, the enforceability of subsequent oral
modifications to the written agreement is unclear.
* B.A., J.D., University of Notre Dame. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.,
Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Siena College; J.D., Hofstra University. Counsel, GLENFED Financial Corpo-
ration, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 26.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
2. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
3. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 9.402(g) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
4. Id. 26.02.
5. The notice must be "boldface, capitalized, underlined or otherwise set out from sur-
rounding written material so as to be conspicuous." Id. 26.02(e). The notice must substan-
tially conform with the following language: "This written loan agreement represents the final
agreement between the parties and may not be contradicted by evidence of prior, contempora-
neous, or subsequent oral agreements of the parties. There are no unwritten oral agreements
between the parties." (emphasis added; footnote omitted) Id.
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B. Rural Homestead Definition
Effective August 28, 1989, the Texas Legislature amended the Property
Code by adding a new subsection (c) to section 41.002, which provides that
"[a] homestead is considered to be rural if, at the time the [homestead]
designation is made, the property is not served by municipal utilities and fire
and police protection."'6 By negative implication, a homestead receiving
these municipal services will apparently be deemed urban.7 The ramifica-
tions of the homestead classification are significant: rural homesteads are ex-
empt up to 200 acres for a family and 100 acres for a single adult, without
regard to value, whereas urban homesteads are exempt only up to one acre.8
The legislature apparently intended to reduce the uncertainty surrounding
urban and rural homestead characterizations by overriding existing case
law. 9 Although not expressly stated, it appears that the homestead
"designation" could be either voluntary or involuntary. A voluntary
designation provides record notice' 0 while an involuntary designation aids
the enforcement of a judgment debt."I If a voluntary designation falls within
section 41.002(c)'s purview, a timely designation arguably preserves a home-
stead's character as rural even if the homestead subsequently receives munic-
ipal services.' 2 It would appear that the property must still be used for the
purpose of a rural homestead in order to qualify for the rural homestead
exemption. 13
C. Tradename Filings
The Texas Legislature amended section 9.402(g) of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code to invalidate the filing of a UCC-1 Financing State-
ment filed solely under a debtor's trade name or assumed name, except
where the debtor's legal name and assumed or trade name are nearly indis-
tinguishable.14 The amendment is effective with respect to financing state-
6. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The statute does not define
the terms "municipal utilities" or "designation." Hence, the classification of a property is
unclear where some, but not all of the services are provided, or where such services are avail-
able but declined by the property owner.
7. Id. 41.002.
8. Id. 41.002(a), (b).
9. Under existing case law, the urban or rural nature of the property is a fact issue to be
determined by a jury. Kimmey v. Goddrum, 346 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 41.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
11. Id. 41.021-.023.
12. Under prior law, the determination of rural or urban homestead was made at the time
a judgment creditor attempted to levy, not when the property was acquired or designated to
homestead usage; thus, over time, urbanization in many instances altered the character of the
property. Lauchieimer & Sons v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 76 S.W. 750 (1903).
13. See In re Spencer, - Bankr. - (Case No. 88-12138) (Bankr., W.D. Tex., June 19,
1989); (In re Moellerdorf, - Bankr. - (Case No. 88-51896-C) (Bankr., W.D. Tex., Jan. 16,
1989).
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 9.402(g) (Vernon Supp. 1990). As amended, the
statute provides:
A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the
individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds
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ments filed after August 31, 1989.15 Under prior law, a trade name filing
sometimes effectively perfected a security interest in personal property where
creditors generally knew the debtor under the trade name.16
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Exemptions
During the survey period, several bankruptcy courts considered chal-
lenges to the 1987 Property Code amendment exempting retirement plans
from attachment by creditors.1 7 Although all the courts focused primarily
on preemption of the exemption by the Employee Retirement Security In-
come Act of 1974 (ERISA), they reached widely disparate results.,,
In the case of In re Dyke, 19 a doctor, relying on the exemption, sought to
exempt approximately $1,170,000 in retirement funds from his bankruptcy
estate.20 The bankruptcy court determined that the state statute "related" to
ERISA so as to invalidate the statute under the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion.2 1 Accordingly, the retirement funds in Dyke remained the property of
the bankruptcy estate to be distributed to creditors.2 2
To the contrary, the bankruptcy court in In re Volpe 23 held the relation of
the Texas exemption statute to ERISA "too tenuous, remote or peripheral to
'relate' within the intendment of [ERISA]." 24 Judge Kelly criticized the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in MacKey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Ser-
vice,25 upon which the Dyke court relied, stating that "the Supreme Court
other trade names or the names of partners. Filing under a trade name or as-
sumed name alone shall not be sufficient to perfect a security interest unless the
trade name or assumed name is so similar to the debtor's legal name that the
trade name or assumed name filing would be discovered in a search of the filing
officer's records ....
15. IM
16. See, eg., McBee v. Nat'l Bank, 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987).
17. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Effective September 1, 1987,
42.0021(a) exempts "a person's right to the assets held in... any stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing, or similar plan, including a retirement plan for self-employed individuals... unless
the plan, contract, or account does not qualify under the applicable provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986."
18. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides that its
provisions "shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan [covered by this statute]." 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1982).
19. 99 Bankr. 343 (Bankr., S.D. Tex. 1989).
20. The debtor claimed the Texas exemption under 11 U.S.C. 522 (1988), which permits
debtors to elect state exemptions in bankruptcy.
21. Dyke, 99 Bankr. at 352. The court cited Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency &
Serv., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988) to support an expansive interpretation of the preemption provi-
sion. In Mackey, the Court determined that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan .... .'The
preemption provision... displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including
state laws that are consistent with [ERISA]." Id. at 2185 (citations omitted; emphasis in
original).
22. See 11 U.S.C. 541 (1988).
23. 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr., W.D. Tex. 1989).
24. Id. at 854-55.
25. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
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fell victim to the allure of a well-turned phrase."'26 According to the Volpe
court, a fundamental distinction exists between a state law that makes refer-
ence to ERISA, as opposed to a state law making substantive reference to
ERISA for purposes of preemption. The court in Volpe allowed the debtor,
also a doctor, to retain $478,753 in profit-sharing and individual retirement
accounts free of creditor claims.
The bankruptcy court in In re Laxson 27 upheld the exemption of a
debtor's individual retirement accounts totalling less than $40,000. The
Laxson court conceded that ERISA arguably preempted the Texas statute,
but determined that preemption was limited to the extent that ERISA regu-
lated the exempt assets. Since individual retirement accounts are not gov-
erned by ERISA, preemption did not apply to the debtor's individual
retirement accounts. 28
The court reaffirmed, in part, In re Komet (Komet II).29 The bankruptcy
court reaffirmed, in part, its prior ruling30 that ERISA preempted the Texas
exemption for qualifled retirement plans. The Komet II court, however, up-
held the debtor's claim that the plans were exempt under Bankruptcy Code
section 522(b)(2)(A) 31 by virtue of ERISA's antialienation provision.32 In so
holding, the Komet II court rejected long established precedent interpreting
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in In re Goff. 33
Although the Texas Legislature enacted no direct response to the judici-
ary's challenge to the retirement plan exemption, the legislature did enact a
savings clause seeking to minimize the effect of nonbankruptcy federal pre-
emption on bankruptcy cases.34
B. Usury
In Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of Oriental Rugs, Inc. 35 the Austin court of
appeals determined that a charge of interest in excess of the contract rate is
per se usurious, even when the rate charged is below the applicable statutory
interest ceiling. 36 The dispute in Hardwick arose under a real estate note
providing for interest at ten percent per annum and an additional ten percent
26. 100 Bankr. at 848.
27. 102 Bankr. 85 (Bankr, N.D. Tex. 1989).
28. 29 U.S.C. 1003(a), 1002(2)(A) (1982) and 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(d)(1) (1989) make
clear that independent retirement accounts are not covered by ERISA.
29. 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr, W.D. Tex 1989).
30. Komet I 93 B.R. 498.
31. 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2)(A) (1988) exempts "any property that is exempt under Federal
[nonbankruptcy] law or state or local law."
32. 104 Bankr. at 805, citing 29 U.S.C. 1056(d) (1982) & Supp. 1986).
33. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
34. The clause reads:
If (the exemption for retirement plans] is declared invalid ... in whole or in part
or in certain circumstances, as applied to a person who has not brought a pro-
ceeding under title 11, United States Code, [the exemption] remains in effect, to
the maximum extent permitted by law, as to any person who has filed that type
of proceeding. TEx. PRoP. CODE ANN. 41.002(e) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
35. 779 S.W.2d 438, 445 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ requested).
36. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 to -1.12 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
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of the unpaid principal balance as attorney's fees upon default. The corpo-
rate borrower contracted to sell the property securing the note, and the
lender demanded payment of the ten percent penalty as a condition of releas-
ing the lien. The lender claimed that past late payments triggered the attor-
ney's fee provision.
The appellate court noted that, absent a contrary statutory provision, the
general usury limit in effect at the time of the loan's inception was ten per-
cent per annum.37 Although corporations were, and still are, authorized to
agree and stipulate to interest rates in excess of the general usury limit,38 the
Hardwick court noted that enforcement of the penalty provision was author-
ized neither by the note nor the deed of trust, and hence, fell outside the
article 1302-2.09 exception to the general usury limit3 9 Accordingly, the
court held the payoff demand to be usurious.40
As of this writing, writ is pending in the Hardwick case. The Hardwick
decision is in direct conflict with the court of appeals decision in Butler v
Holt,41 where the San Antonio court of appeals held a charge under the
statutory ceiling to be nonusurious, even though the rate exceeded the con-
tractual limit. In Butler the Supreme Court initially granted and recently
withdrew a writ of error.42
Fischer v. Westinghouse Credit43 involved the application of an interest
spreading clause to a late charge imposed by the lender on a past due interest
installment. The debt arose under a limited partnership investor note
pledged to secure a lohn from Westinghouse to the partnership. The part-
nership's obligations were further secured by a surety bond issued in favor of
Westinghouse.
Upon Fischer's failure to remit a $3,357 interest installment, Westing-
house submitted a proof of loss to the surety. Westinghouse assigned the
note to the surety, who, in turn, reimbursed Westinghouse in the sum of
$5,438.03, which included the $3,357 installment and a late charge of
$2,081.03. Thereafter, the surety accelerated the note and made demand
upon Fischer.
Notwithstanding the assignment, Westinghouse subsequently accepted
payment of the $3,357 installment from Fischer and de-accelerated and re-
37. Id. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1987). Effective in 1981, the Texas Legislature enacted a
provision authorizing parties to contract, in writing, for a higher rate of interest, usually eight-
een percent, subsequent to the making of a loan. Id. art. 5069-1.04. Where the parties have no
agreement as to interest, the applicable usury ceiling is six percent per annum. Id. art. 5069-
1.03.
38. Id. art. 1302-2.09.
39. Id.
40. 779 S.W.2d at 445. The court also determined that, although Hardwick honestly be-
lieved he was entitled to the additional ten percent, the charge was "intentional"; thus Hard-
wick could not rely upon "bona fide error" as a defense to usury. 779 S.W.2d at 443; see TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
41. 741 S.W.2d 169, 175-76 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1987, writ granted, order with-
drawn; denied, reh's granted in part on other grounds, 732 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1987).
42. Id.
43. 760 S.W.2d 802, 807 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
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assigned the note from the surety back to itself. After the surety sought to
collect the late fee, Fischer commenced an action against the lender and the
surety for usury. Each of the parties moved for summary judgment, and the
trial court ruled in favor of the lender and surety on the usury claim.
On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of Fischer's summary judgment
motion.44 The court of appeals next rejected the lender's argument that the
late charge should be spread over the entire unpaid principal balance, over
the full term of the loan. 45 The late charge at issue was, apparently, com-
puted as interest on the past-due installment, accruing daily, rather than as a
one-time charge. The court held that the past-due installment should be
treated as a separate loan for usury purposes and that the late charge should
be deemed to be the interest charged on that loan, spread over the time the
installment remained unpaid.46 The appellate court remanded the usury
claim against the lender to the trial court but affirmed the summary judg-
ment as to the surety.47
In Woodcrest Associates, Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.48 the
court considered a usury claim based upon an acceleration letter sent by the
lender's attorney. The dispute arose from the lender's efforts to obtain pos-
session of an apartment complex securing the loan. The attorney's letter
demanded payment of a specific sum, but referred to the borrower's obliga-
tions under the underlying contract, which contained a savings clause.49
The court held that the letter incorporated the savings clause by reference,
and absent evidence that the lender intended to violate the usury law, the
savings clause would be given effect to restrict the demand to the maximum
amount allowed by law.50
In Sunbelt Service Corp. v,. Vandenburg,51 the court of appeals reversed a
summary judgment in favor of the general partner of two partnership bor-
rowers who had asserted a usury counterclaim against a lender suing on
partnership notes assumed by the general partner.5 2 The general partner
relied upon the "Alamo Lumber" doctrine that a borrower's assumption of
the debts of a third party as a condition of making a new loan requires the
lender to include the debt assumed in its interest calculations. 53 The appel-
late court distinguished the instant case on the grounds that a general part-
ner is liable for the partnerships' debts as a matter of law, thus the
assumption was not of a third party's debt, and the usury claim could not be
44. Id. at 806. In his pleadings, Fischer conceded that the note was accelerated at the
time of demand, and argued that the demand was "tainted" by the subsequent de-acceleration.
45. Id. at 807.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 775 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
49. The documents stated that interest "contracted for, chargeable, or receivable ... in
connection with this loan transaction shall under no circumstances exceed the maximum
amount of interest permitted by applicable law." Id. at 438.
50. Id. at 439.
51. 774 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
52. Id. at 818.
53. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gould, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928 (rex. 1983).
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sustained.54
C. Foreclosures and Guarantor Liability
In Van Brunt v. Banctexas Quorum 55 the Dallas court of appeals denied a
secured creditor's deficiency claim against the guarantor based upon non-
compliance with the notice provisions governing private sales of collateral,56
notwithstanding that the defective private sale yielded significantly more
than the prior, properly noticed public sale. In Van Brunt, the secured party
initially conducted a public sale of collateral upon proper notice and an-
nounced its reservation of right to reject any and all bids. At the sale, which
the guarantor attended, the highest bid for the collateral was $40,000. Sub-
sequently, the secured party rejected the $40,000 bid and negotiated a pri-
vate sale of the collateral for the sum of $55,000 without further notice to
the guarantor.
In the ensuing deficiency suit, the guarantor argued that the private sale
violated section 9.504,57 thereby voiding his liability under the guaranty.
The trial court found the notice to be sufficient and entered judgment for the
secured creditor.
On appeal, the Van Brunt court noted that section 9.50458 required the
secured party to provide reasonable notice of the private sale to the guaran-
tor. The court declined to assume that the guarantor was not harmed by the
failure to give adequate notice of the sale. Accordingly, the appellate court
reversed the lower court's ruling and entered a take-nothing judgment. 59
54. 774 S.W.2d at 817.
55. No. 05.87-01165-cv (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 15, 1989) (not yet reported).
56. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 9.504 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
57. No. 05-87-01165-cv (rex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 15, 1989) (not yet reported), slip op. at
17.
58. Id.
59. Id
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